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Abstract
This study examined the relationship between the need for cognition and impression
formation, particularly with common biases. Upon listening to a speaker with either a
heavy Japanese or Los Angeles accent, participants rated the speaker on how wellinformed they believed she appeared to be on the subject she spoke about and on
intelligence. Despite the need for cognition, speakers with a Los Angeles accent were
rated less favorably on intelligence, compared to Japanese accented speakers. However,
the high need for cognition participants utilized a stereotype in impression formation, as
their ratings for both speakers resonated with the speaker’s respective stereotype.
Contrary to previous research findings, this study suggests that high need for cognition
individuals are actually not protected from common biases, and these biases affect people
of

varying

levels

of

need

for

cognition

in

different

ways.
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Can Motivated Cognition Exacerbate a Bias?
The Need For Cognition
Social cognition research has shed light onto the notion that individuals differ in
their tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thinking, a construct coined as need for
cognition by Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955). It is widely believed that this
phenomenon serves as the underlying mechanism that dictates peoples’ acquisition and
use of information. Need for cognition (NFC) is believed to be a measurable
characteristic, as NFC scales are commonly used for assessment. Individuals classified as
“high NFC” are those who derive enjoyment from cognitively effortful tasks.
Consequently, these people not only exert more effort onto these cognitively effortful
tasks, but are more likely to engage in them as well (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol Horcajo, &
Strathman, 2008). On the other hand, those who fall into the “low NFC” criteria exhibit
opposite tendencies.
The Need For Cognition on Impression Formation Theories
As theories of judgment in social psychology gained acknowledgement, NFC
began to be utilized as a means to assess how people develop judgments based on
impressions. In the context of theories of impression formation, a significant amount of
research has led to the implication that individuals who are low in NFC are more likely to
rely on stereotypes to form impressions on people—and even groups (Petty, Briñol,
Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). In fact, it has been noted that total scores on the NFC Scale
are negatively correlated with those on the Modern Racism Scale (Crawford &
Skowronski, 1998). This is thought to be due to low-NFC peoples’ tendency to not
engage in effortful thinking of the individual, which ultimately leads to a failure to
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individuate the person(s) in light of the lack of detail cognitively acquired. On the
contrary, research has also supported that high-NFC people are often times “protected”
from typical impression formation biases, seeing that they are readily able to retain and
utilize more cognitive information, instead of merely relying on common biases (Petty, et
al., 2009). These two notions resonate well with each other, as their logic is consistent
with one another.
However, in contrast to much of the research supporting that high-NFC
individuals are protected from common biases, another line of research has suggested that
their motivated thought can actually exacerbate a bias (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998).
Though this seemingly contradicts former research, it actually signifies that common
biases (i.e., stereotypes) affect people with different levels of NFC in different ways.
Petty et al. (2008) attributed these findings to the following:
1. Constructs are readily activated in high-NFC people, as opposed to low-NFC
people.
2. Seeing that high-NFC individuals engage in more thought, there are simply more
available thoughts to be biased (i.e., more opportunities are present)
3. High-NFC people tend to be more susceptible to priming effects, compared to
their counterparts.
Thus, the purpose of this study was to assess how individuals, of varying levels of
need for cognition, would rate a female speaker, who spoke with either a heavy Los
Angeles or heavy Japanese accent, on both how well-informed she was on the subject she
spoke about and intelligence. Due to the abundance of research supporting this notion, I
predicted that if subjects were to score lower on a NFC test, then they would rate the
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woman with a heavy Japanese accent as more intelligent and more well-informed,
compared to subjects who scored higher on a NFC test. As investigated by Maykovich
(1971), common stereotypes of Japanese people include the view that they are very
intelligent and industrious. Therefore, I hypothesized that low-NFC individuals would
fall victim to the utilization of this bias when rating the speaker.
Participants
Participants in this study consisted of 42 University of San Francisco (USF)
students in an introductory psychology course. Due to the gender-ratio of psychology
students at USF, it is important to note there were only three male participants (Table 1).
The majority of the subjects were between the ages of 18 and 21, with the exception of
two whom were 22 and 30 years of age (Table 2). The participants in this study received
partial credit towards the fulfillment of their introductory psychology course requirement.
Seeing that this was designed as a 2 (accent: Japanese vs. Los Angeles) x 2 (need for
cognition: low vs. high) experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the accent
condition. Upon completing the need for cognition test, subjects were also assigned to
their adequate NFC condition based on their scores.
Materials and Procedure
The survey administered to the participants was comprised of many questions
regarding different elements about the speaker they had heard. Only elements relevant to
my hypothesis were assessed. First, subjects completed a nine-point scale, 18-question
need for cognition scale (α = .83); the scale administered to subjects was a slightly
amended version of the scale Petty and Cacioppo (1982) used in their study. Following
the experiment, items on the scale were recoded so that higher scores on the scale
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correspond to high NFC and vice versa. Fourteen participants were determined to be high
NFC, while 13 were low NFC. These were the result of a median split completed on these
scores.
After completion of the NFC scale, participants were purposefully misled to
believe they would each be assigned a random audio clip to listen to, which ranged a
variety of topics. In reality, there were only two audio clips and one topic discussed: a
description of a student’s favorite city. The aspect that did vary between the participants,
though, was whether the speaker spoke with a heavy Japanese or Los Angeles accent.
Even so, the speaker for both audio clips was the same person and the passages recited
were identical. Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to the Los Angeles accent
condition, while 11 were assigned to the Japanese accent condition.
Following the audio clip, subjects answered a variety of questions regarding the
speaker; most importantly, they judged how intelligent the speaker seemed to them, and
how well-informed the speaker seemed about the subject she spoke. The response scale
for both items ranged from zero to nine, with nine reflecting that participants felt either
the speaker was very intelligent or very well-informed on the subject spoken about, and
zero reflecting the opposite. It is important to note that several manipulation checks were
present in order to ensure that the participants were fully attentive throughout the study.
Ratings of the speaker’s intelligence and how well-informed she seemed on the subject
she spoke about were assessed in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the two
levels of the accent condition (Los Angeles vs. Japanese) and two levels of NFC
condition (low-NFC vs. high-NFC)
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Results for Ratings of Intelligence
Accent type. A significant main effect was found for ratings of intelligence on
type of accent, F (1,27) = 13.55, p = .001. Regardless of NFC, the speaker with a Los
Angeles accent was rated much lower (m = 3.47; se = .48) in contrast to the speaker with
a Japanese accent (m = 6.38; se = .63) on intelligence.
Need for cognition. Results demonstrated a non-significant main effect for
intelligence ratings on NFC, F (1,27) = 2.47, p = .13. Excluding accent type, low-NFC
subjects rated the speaker on the basis of intelligence similarly to their counterparts (m =
4.30, 5.54; se = .61, .50)
Need for cognition x Accent type. The two-way ANOVA yielded a marginally
significant main effect for the intelligence ratings interaction between NFC by accent
type, F (1,27) = 3.64, p = .07. Interestingly, the average rating for the Japanese speaker
was significantly higher for high-NFC individuals (m = 7.75; se = .66) compared to lowNFC individuals (m = 5.00; se = 1.07). On the other hand, both low- and high-NFC
participants rated the Los Angeles accented speaker similarly (m = 3.60, 3.33; se = .59,
.76). Figure one, located in the appendix, exhibits these findings.
Results for Ratings of Well-informed
Accent type. A main effect for participants’ ratings of how well informed the
speaker appeared on accent type yielded an F ratio of F (1,27) = .648, p = .429, proving
to be non-significant.
Need for cognition. As with ratings of intelligence, a non-significant main effect
occurred for well-informed ratings on NFC, F (1,27) = 1.10, p = .31. Omitting type of
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accent condition, low-NFC subjects did not differ significantly on their ratings (m = 5.80;
se = .53) in comparison to high-NFC subjects (m = 6.52; se = .44).
Need for cognition x Accent type. A significant two-way interaction between NFC
by accent type for well-informed ratings was present, F (1,27) = 9.80, p = .005.
Following suit to the previous two-way interaction, high-NFC individuals evaluated the
Japanese accented speaker more favorably on how well-informed she seemed regarding
the subject she spoke (m = 7.88; se = .57) as opposed to low-NFC individuals’ ratings (m
= 5.00; se = .93). Upon assessing the Los Angeles accented speaker on how wellinformed she seemed, however, low- and high-NFC subjects rated her analogously (m =
6.60, 5.17; se = .51, .66). Figure two demonstrates these results.
Discussion
Although the results did not provide support for my initial hypothesis, they were
nonetheless sound and consistent with former empirical findings. First, a discrepancy was
noted in the speakers’ intelligence ratings between accent type conditions, without
considering NFC. The Japanese accented speaker was rated significantly higher on
intelligence (m = 6.38; se = .63) when compared the Los Angeles accented speaker (m =
3.47; se = .48). This implies that subjects fell victim to utilizing the common stereotype
when judging the speaker that Japanese people are very intelligent. It could also infer that
subjects fell victim to the contrary common stereotype that people with a heavy Los
Angeles accent are generally “stupid” (Goodine and Johns, 2014).
However, when evaluating the Japanese speaker, high-NFC subjects rated the
speaker much more favorably on intelligence (m = 7.75) and how well-informed she
appeared to be (m = 7.88) compared to low-NFC subjects’ ratings of intelligence (m =
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5.00) and well-informed (m = 5.00). The Los Angeles accented speaker’s ratings
exhibited no major difference by NFC. Though these findings are directly opposite to
what I hypothesized, the implications are clear: for both Los Angeles and Japanese
accented speakers, high-NFC individuals are relying on the respective stereotype when
forming judgments.
The (little) research supporting my findings attributes high-NFC individuals’
susceptibility to and protection from common biases to priming effects. It is believed that
high-NFC individuals have a lower threshold for the activation of primes due to their
tendency to engage in effortful thinking (Petty, et al., 2008). Therefore, high-NFC
individuals respond more readily to priming effects. Without initially realizing it, the
subjects were all subjected to a biasing agent. Subjects in the Los Angeles accent
condition were primed to consider the speakers’ identity by listening to a heavy Los
Angeles accent. This priming induction serves as a biasing agent which predisposes
subjects to think about the speaker in relation to her Los Angeles identity, seeing that the
accented speech was hyperbolic. Likewise, subjects in the Japanese accent condition
encountered a similar biasing agent; however, it related to the Japanese accented
speaker’s identity instead. It could very well be the case that high-NFC people simply
had a greater cognitive capacity and greater tendency to engage in cognition, which
enabled them to simply remember the speaker’s accent in relation to her identity more so
than low-NFC subjects. Thus, explaining why high-NFC subjects utilized the respective
stereotype more than low-NFC subjects.
In general, if a biasing agent is blatant, people are likely to correct for it; that is, if
people are primed with a biasing agent that is very apparent, they are more likely to
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realize that the source of their judgment of the construct is due to the priming induction
rather than their personal reaction (Petty, et al., 2008). On the other hand, people have a
harder time correcting for biasing agents that are subtle. Given this logic, it would be
sound to assume that high-NFC people would be able to correct the biasing agent in the
study, especially since it was very hyperbolic (i.e., blatant). However, they failed to
correct the bias. Nonetheless, this does explain why previous research has supported the
notion that high-NFC people are protected from common biases.
I believe the failure to correct the bias occurred because the subjects were given a
plethora of seemingly random questions to answer about the speaker. The questions
varied in nature, making it hard to connect them all to one construct. Ergo, the
participants were greatly distracted to the point that I believe they overlooked the blatant
priming biases. If they were merely given my two questions to answer on speaker
intelligence and how well-informed she seemed, I believe high-NFC individuals would
have been more likely to correct for the bias since answering only two questions is a lot
less distracting.
In line with this, research findings have also suggested correction effects for
biasing agents and primes are most likely to occur when the content is clear and
unambiguous (Petty, et al., 2008). Though the passage recited by the speaker was
descriptive, the information given was still vague and ambiguous. The speaker could
have virtually been describing any major city in the world because the passage never
once mentioned anything to denote the specific city. Thus, I also believe that due to the
lack of detailed information given by the speaker, high-NFC subjects were able to more
readily use the given biasing agent (i.e., speaker’s accent) to form an impression about
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the speaker. Low-NFC subjects, on the other hand, failed to do this because this
connection takes cognitive effort. High-NFC subjects’ motivated thought led them to
form a biased judgment of the speaker. If the content of the passage recited gave more
specific information as to the speaker’s identity, I believe high-NFC subjects would not
have needed to rely on the bias to judge the speaker.
This study demonstrates that high-NFC individuals are susceptible to biased
judgments, much like their counterparts. Different contributing factors, however,
determine this effect. One factor noted is the saliency of a priming effect (e.g., biasing
agent). Though this correctional effect was not exhibited in this study, blatant priming
effects are more likely to be corrected, especially by high-NFC individuals. A further
study could perhaps examine saliency of the priming effect as a separate independent
variable, and see how directly manipulating its saliency may affect judgment ratings.
Another factor noted is the ambiguity of the target. Targets that are unambiguous and
clear leave less room for biased cues to be needed in impression formation. The reason
being that if information is clearer, then fewer assumptions have to be made. Another
further study could also include ambiguity of the target as an independent variable to
assess the extent of this effect. As this study demonstrated, thoughtfully motivated people
ironically exhibit a bias in their impression formation, just as much (if not more) than
their counterparts.
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Appendix
Table 1. Participant Gender
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Male

3

7.1

7.1

Female

39

92.9

100.0

Total

42

100.0

100.0

Table 2. Participant Age
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

18

13

31.0

31.0

19

20

47.6

78.6

20

3

7.1

85.7

21

4

9.5

95.2

22

1

2.4

97.6

30

1

2.4

100.0

Total

42

100.0

100.0

Table 3. Between-Subjects Factors
Condition:

N

Los Angeles Accent

16

Japanese Accent

11

Low-NFC

13

High-NFC

14
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Table 3. Two-way
way Interaction Results
Dependent

Accent Type

NFC

Mean

Std. Error

Los Angeles

Low-NFC

3.60

.587

High-NFC

3.33

.758

Low-NFC

5.00

1.072

High-NFC

7.75

.656

Low-NFC

6.60

.511

High-NFC

5.167

.660

Low-NFC

5.00

.933

High-NFC

7.875

.572

Variable
How intelligent
does the speaker
seem to you?

Japanese

How wellinformed does the
speaker seem on
the subject she has
spoke about?

Los Angeles

Japanese

Intelligence Ratings
Mean of Intelligence Ratings

9
7.75

8
7
6

5

5
4

3.6

3.33

3
2
1
0
Los Angeles - LowNFC

Los Angeles - High- Japanese - Low-NFC Japanese - High-NFC
NFC
Accent Type x NFC

Figure 1. Average intelligence ratings by accent type and NFC
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Average of Well-informed Ratings

Well-informed Ratings
9

7.9

8
7

6.6

6

5.167

5

5
4
3
2
1
0
Los Angeles - LowNFC

Los Angeles - High- Japanese - Low-NFC Japanese - High-NFC
NFC
Accent type x NFC

Figure 2. Average well
well-informed ratings by accent type and NFC
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